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Abstract—The testability of the cryptographic cores brings
in an extra dimension to the process of digital circuits testing
– security. The benefits of the classical methods such as the
scan-chain method introduce new vulnerabilities concerning
the data protection. The Built-In Self-Test (BIST) is considered
to be the most suitable countermeasure for this purpose.
In this work we propose the use of a digit-serial multiplier
over GF(2m), that is at the heart of many public-key
cryptosystems, as a basic building block for the BIST
circuitry. We show how the multiplier can be configured
to operate as a Test Pattern Generator and a Signature
Analyzer. Furthermore, the multiplier becomes a fully
self-testable design. All the additional features come at the
cost of only a few extra gates. With the hardware overhead of
0.33 % this approach makes the multiplier perfectly suitable
for the low-end embedded devices.
Keywords-Built-In Self-Test; Pseudorandom Testing; Secu-
rity; Public-Key Cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
As circuits become larger and more complex, the process
of testing a digital system remains a consistently growing
problem. Design for testability (DFT) aims at providing an
efficient testing method with a minimal cost. Testability is
considered during design and needs to be addressed with
the design of the rest of the system. The most common
method for delivering the test data from the circuit inputs is
called a scan-design. The data is delivered through registers
that are connected to one or more scan-chains. The method
seems to be very efficient, introducing a small hardware
overhead and is especially suitable for embedded devices.
At the same time, as the embedded systems evolve from
isolated devices to always-on networked devices, security
becomes a paramount issue. Testing the cryptographic
applications brings in an extra dimension – security. The
most popular DFT techniques today, such as scan-chains,
provide an observability of the internal nodes from the I/O
pins of a device. As the embedded devices often store and
process confidential data, such an approach is inadequate.
There are several scan-chain based attacks published in the
literature [19], [2].
The Built-In Self-Test (BIST) is considered to be the
most suitable approach for testing the cryptographic cores.
Since the internal registers of the device can not be ac-
cessed from the BIST I/O interface, it provides an inherent
protection from the scan-chain based attacks. There are
generally three approaches of the BIST testing: Exhaustive,
Deterministic and Pseudorandom. The exhaustive approach
achieves 100 % fault coverage but is exponential in number
of the circuit inputs and becomes impractical for circuits
with large number of I/O pins. The deterministic approach
analyzes a Circuit Under Test (CUT) prior to testing and
determines the appropriate test set to be applied. Finally,
the pseudorandom approach is based on applying pseudo-
random patterns as the test stimuli. A design is said to
be pseudorandom pattern testable if the application of a
fixed length sequence of pseudorandom patterns will detect,
with a high confidence level, all faults of a particular fault
class [15]. Due to the simplicity and the efficiency of
its implementation this approach is very efficient testing
solution.
A class of circuits which exposes excellent pseudoran-
dom testability properties are cryptographic cores [16].
Specific structures and operations used for the implemen-
tation of cryptographic algorithms enable good random
patterns propagation thus providing high testability. So far,
only cores supporting the symmetric-key cryptography (e.g.
block ciphers) were examined for the BIST purpose [4],
[11], [16]. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the
first attempt to use a public-key cryptographic core for a
testing purpose. As a modular multiplication is at the heart
of many public-key algorithms such as RSA [13], Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) [8], [10], Diffie-Hellman, El-
Gamal, Schnorr, DSA [9], we use a digit-serial multiplier
as a starting point and build the whole BIST circuitry based
on it. We specifically target the low-end embedded devices
and hence consider the ECC to be an appropriate choice
for the public-key cryptosystem. Therefore, we start with
a digit-serial multiplier over GF(2m) that is at the core of
the ECC algorithm.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In order to make the following discussion easier, we
first introduce a basic concept of the BIST and discuss
the stuck-at fault model. Second, we explain basics of
the modular arithmetic over GF(2m) and introduce some
notations that are used further throughout the paper. Finally,
we provide some definitions and mention the related work
of the random pattern testability which we later exploit in
our model.
A. Built-In Self-Test and the Stuck-At Fault Model
Figure 1 represents the basic concept of the Built-In
Self-Test environment. A BIST circuitry consists of a Test
Pattern Generator (TPG) and a Signature Analyzer (SA).
The TPG is used to produce test patterns which are fed into
the Circuit Under Test (CUT). The SA compacts the CUT’s
responses into a single signature, which is then compared
to the precomputed golden value. Besides the basic compo-
nents the BIST infrastructure also comprises the controller
for scheduling different testing phases and the comparator
for the final comparison. As the controller and comparator
are common for almost all testing environments, we focus
on the basic BIST components, namely TPG and SA.
   
Figure 1. General BIST settings.
Concerning the choice of an appropriate fault model,
Patel [12] points out that if a defect internal to a CMOS
simple gate is detectable by some Boolean test then it is
sufficient to have only the test vectors that test the stuck-at
faults on the gate terminals. Therefore, when discussing a
fault model, we consider the stuck-at fault model only.
In order to test a two-input AND or a two-input XOR
gate against the stuck-at faults it is enough to apply three
input test vectors (01, 10, 11).1 We assume that the logic
gates are atomic and the faults manifest at their I/O pins.
It is an abstract fault model where a stuck-at fault does not
mean the I/O pin is shorted to the power supply or ground.
In fact that means when the line is applied with a certain
logic value (0 or 1), it produces a logical error [12].
B. Modular Arithmetic over GF(2m)
Each element of the field GF(2m) can be represented as
a polynomial of degree less than or equal to m−1, written
as A(x) =
mw−1∑
i=0
Aix
iw = (Amw−1 . . . A0)2w where Ai
represents a single digit and Ai ∈ [0, 2w−1]; mw represents
the number of digits and is equal to
⌈
m/w
⌉
where w
is a digit-size. A special case is when w = 1 and the
representation of A(x) = (Am−1 . . . A0)2 is called a bit
representation.
An addition (subtraction) of two elements in GF(2m)
is equivalent to a bit-wise XOR operation of these two
elements and can be implemented very efficiently. A multi-
plication in GF(2m) is multiplication modulo an irreducible
polynomial that is used to define the field. Let B(x) and
C(x) represent two elements in GF(2m) and let P (x) be
an irreducible polynomial of degree m over GF(2) used to
define the finite field. The multiplication of B(x) and C(x)
over GF(2m) is defined as
A(x) = B(x) × C(x) , B(x) · C(x) mod P (x) .
Algorithm 1 shows a digit-serial multiplication over
GF(2m). Due to the use of carry-free arithmetic, the al-
gorithm is especially suitable for efficient hardware imple-
mentations. Step 3 of the algorithm performs a simple add
and accumulate operation by adding a product BiC(x) to
the shifted value of the accumulator A(x). An eventual
1An XOR gate can also be tested with any other three-element subset
of (00, 01, 10, 11).
overflow is detected in step 4 and the following reduction is
performed in step 5 by subtracting the multiple of modulus
P (x).
Algorithm 1 Digit-serial multiplication over GF(2m).
Input: B(x) = (Bmw−1 . . . B0)2w , C(x) =
(Cmw−1 . . . C0)2w and P (x) = xm + p(x) where
p(x) = (Pmw−1 . . . P0)2w
Output: A(x) = B(x)C(x) mod P (x).
1: A(x) = 0
2: for i = mw − 1 downto 0 do
3: A(x) = A(x)xw +BiC(x)
4: qi = A(x) div P (x);
5: A(x) = A(x) + qiP (x)
6: end for
7: return A(x).
Note that for the case of w = 1 step 4 of the algorithm
can be performed very efficiently by evaluating only the
most significant bit of A(x).
C. Random Pattern Testability
The random pattern testability has been extensively ex-
amined in the literature. Here, we outline basics and define
some terms that will be used later in our discussion.
In order to estimate the number of (pseudo) random
patterns required to test a CUT, we recall a well known
testability procedure called Controllability Observability
Procedure (COP) [7]. We define the i-controllability, and
the observability of a node N. Then, by combining the two,
we derive the fault detectability of the same node.
• The i-controllability for a node N, Ci(N), i ∈ {0, 1},
is the probability of appearing the logic i on the node
N.
• The observability of the node N, O(N) is defined as
the probability of observing the logic value of the node
at one of the primary outputs.
• The fault detectability of the node N, Pi(N), represents
the probability of detecting stuck-at i fault at node
N by a random pattern and is defined as Pi(N) =
C1−i(N)O(N).
Assume we have a circuit with k randomly inserted
faults. Let the smallest fault detectability be called the criti-
cal fault detectability, denoted as p = min{Pi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
The test quality q is defined as a probability that all faults
are detected after the random test set of the length N is
applied. Given the test quality q, Savir and Bardelin [15]
derive a formula which provides an upper bound of the test
length:
N ≤
⌈
ln (e/k)
ln (1− p)
⌉
(1)
where e = 1− q. In contrast to finding an exact value of
N , this method requires less effort of analyzing the CUT
prior to testing and thus has more practical importance [15].
III. THE PROPOSED TESTING METHOD
The testing method we propose enables configuration of
digit serial multiplier over GF(2m) as both TPG and SA,
therefore providing the testing infrastructure for the other
components. In addition, setting the multiplier to operate
in the self-test mode it is possible to detect the faults of its
own structure.
Our testing approach is based on generating pseudoran-
dom patterns rather than providing a minimized, determin-
istic set of test vectors that is sufficient to perform the
full testing against the stuck-at faults. By doing so, we
introduce a minimal hardware overhead which makes this
approach very suitable for the low-cost embedded devices.
Furthermore, we reduce the effort of analyzing the CUT
prior to testing in order to determine the minimized set of
test vectors.
A. Building a Digit-Serial Multiplier
An efficient implementation of a digit-serial multiplier
in finite fields of characteristic 2 has been an interesting
research problem and there is a number of different designs
proposed in the literature. What is of our main interest, are
the multipliers used for the cryptographic applications and
hence we mention some of the related work. Großscha¨del
proposed a bit-serial multiplier performing multiplications
in both types of field, GF(p) and GF(2m) [6]. A sim-
ilar hardware solution is also presented by Wolkerstor-
fer in [18]. A very compact Modular Arithmetic Logic
Unit (MALU) that performs a digit-serial multiplication
over GF(2m) and a modular addition was introduced by
Sakiyama [14]. The MALU is designed in a natural way
to serve as an arithmetic core for the low-end devices.
Therefore, we use the multiplier based on the MALU as
a study case for our testing strategy.
The multiplier’s basic cell consists of the full length
AND and XOR arrays as shown in the right-hand part
of Fig. 2a. The A1 array performs multiplication while
the X1 (X2) array performs addition (reduction) modulo
2. The structure of the X2 array is determined by the
irreducible polynomial which is of the form P (x) =
xm + pm−1x
m−1 + . . . + p1x + p0, where pj ∈ {0, 1},
and the array is used for the reduction. Hence, the whole
structure of the multiplier’s basic cell is built out of the
independent basic building blocks shown in Fig. 3.
A multiplier and a multiplicand are stored in the registers
B and C respectively, and the register A acts as an
accumulator. The register A is always shifted to the left by
one bit (multiplication by 2), added to the partial product
and then reduced by the polynomial P (x) if needed. By
using a single cell it is possible to perform a bit-serial
multiplication only. In order to implement a digit-serial
multiplier, w cells need to be connected in a serial manner
as shown in Fig. 2a.
In this paper we explore a possibility to use the multi-
plier as a TPG and an SA for testing other modules of
the cryptographic core. Furthermore, we analyze a self-
testability of a digit-serial multiplier over GF(2m) which
is based on the original MALU. All the novel properties
of the multiplier come at the very low hardware overhead
and are shown in Fig. 2b. Section III-E further discusses
the hardware overhead of the proposed design.
The proposed multiplier can perform the following
modes of operation: Normal, Test Pattern Generator (TPG),
Signature Analyzer (SA), and Self-Test (ST). Table I sum-
marizes the functionality of the multiplier depending on
the control signals CTRL0 and CTRL1 (when the control
signal is low the multiplexer passes the upper bit; see
Fig. 2b). Note that the signal CTRL0 remains the same
during the Setup Phase and Configuration Phase, while the
signal CTRL1 changes. Four modes of operation are further
discussed in the following sections. We first consider a case
when the multiplier works as a TPG (Section. III-B) and
then we discuss about the multiplier in the SA and the ST
mode (Sections. III-C and III-D, respectively).
Table I
FOUR MODES OF OPERATION.
Configuration Setup Phase Configuration Phase
Mode CTRL0 CTRL1 CTRL0 CTRL1
Normal 0 0 0 0
TPG 1 1 1 0
SA 0 1 0 1
ST 1 1 1 0
B. Test Pattern Generator and Its Randomness
This section examines the randomness of the patterns
produced by the proposed multiplier based TPG. While
the randomness is an inherent property of cryptographic
engines, the randomness of a single digit-serial multiplier
is not so obvious. As a final test, we perform the NIST
randomness testing composed of 15 statistical tests and
show that our construction behaves very similar to an LFSR
that is very often used as a pseudo-random test pattern
generator.
In order to operate in the TPG mode, the multiplier
needs to be properly initialized (Setup Phase) and modified
(Configuration Phase) such that the least significant bit
(LSB) of the shifting register B is updated from the most
significant bit (MSB) of the register A. This tweak ensures
the randomness of the register B even after m cycles are
performed. The multiplexer M1, controlled by the signal
CTRL0, is taking care of this modification. The multiplexer
M2 only passes the MSB of the register B in the Configura-
tion Phase (see Table I). Finally, the multiplexer M3 has no
influence in this mode. However, in order to have only two
control signals in total, the multiplexer M3 is controlled by
CTRL0 and passes the Am−1 bit of the register A (this is
further explained in Section III-D).
Our first aim is to evaluate the output probabilities
of the proposed multiplier based TPG. To simplify the
approach, we decompose the multiplier into segments of
basic building blocks such as simple structures of AND
and XOR gate arrays. As it is shown in Fig. 2a, the basic
building block of a digit-serial multiplier over GF(2m) can
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Figure 2. (a) Architecture of a digit-serial multiplier over GF(2m). (b) Compact digit-serial multiplier architecture supporting the Normal, TPG, SA
and ST mode.
be implemented as depicted in Fig. 3. It is a simple Reed-
Muller structure [3] that contains one AND gate (A1) and
two XOR gates (X1, X2).
With PB , PC , PA and PQ we denote the input prob-
abilities of the circuit in Fig. 3. The probabilities of the
intermediate signals X and Y are evaluated as PX = PBPC
and PY = PA(1− PBPC) + PBPC(1− PA), respectively.
A
Q
A1 X1 X2C
B
X Y
O
Figure 3. Basic building block of a digit-serial multiplier over GF(2m).
Let us now compute a probability PO(i) of an arbitrary
output bit of the multiplier being logic 1 in the i-th iteration
(i.e. output probability). Since the registers A and C are
updated from the same source (the multiplier’s output), the
probabilities PC(i+1), PA(i+1) and PQ(i+1) are equal
to PO(i). Combining the equations for PX and PY , we can
finally compute the probability of an output bit being logic
1 at the end of the (i+ 1)-th iteration.
PO(i+1) = 4PBPO(i)
3−(4PB+2)PO(i)
2+(2+PB)PO(i)
where PB is a parameter and it holds
PB =
{
1
2
if i ≤ m;
PB(i) if i > m.
The previous assumption holds since, for i ≤ m, B is
a random number with a uniform distribution (during the
Setup Phase we choose the values of B and C uniformly at
random). After m cycles, the value of PB is a function of
i since the LSB of the register B is updated with the MSB
of the register A. Let us now observe a general case where
PB ∈ (0, 1) and analyze this iterative equation in order to
see how the function of Pi behaves when the number of
iterations goes to infinity.
Assuming that the function is convergent, PO(i+1) and
PO(i) will converge to the same point as i goes to infinity.
Therefore, we can write P¯ = 4PBP¯ 3 − (4PB + 2)P¯ 2 +
(2 + PB)P¯ , where P¯ denotes the convergence point. A
graphical representation of the function helps us to illustrate
the estimation of the convergence point and is depicted in
Fig. 4. It can be easily shown that the convergence point
P¯ is equal to 1
2
.
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Figure 4. Graphical representation of the iterative function (2).
Let us first observe the case when PO(i) < 12 . The
function is clearly concave and always above the line
PO(i+ 1) = PO(i). This implies that PO(i+ 1) > PO(i).
Since Eq. (2) is iterative, the value of PO(i+1) will always
be increasing, and hence it must hold lim
i→∞
PO(i + 1) =
PO(i) =
1
2
. Second, if PO(i) > 12 , the function is always
below the line PO(i+1) = PO(i) and the value of PO(i+1)
will always be decreasing in the following iterations. After
a certain number of iterations, the value of PO(i+ 1) will
become less than 1
2
and will again converge to 1
2
as i
increases. Since if PO(i) = 12 then PO(i + 1) =
1
2
, this
is indeed a convergence point. Finally, it is important to
note here that for PO(i) = 12 , the value of PY will be
equal to 1
2
, independently of PB .
We conclude that, no matter what the value of PB is,
the output probability of an arbitrary output converges to
1
2
. As all the m output bits are computed independently,
following the same principle, all the output probabilities
converge to the same value. It turns out that, if the multiplier
is initialized properly, the output probability converges to 1
2
quite rapidly and ensures that after only a few iterations gets
very close to a desired value. The only strict requirement
is that PB = 1 in the first iteration (Setup Phase). By
satisfying this condition, the multiplier loads a random
value of the register C as the initial seed. This is ensured
by setting the CTRL1 signal to logic 1 during the Setup
Phase (see Table I).
To examine the randomness of the output bits, we have
implemented a multiplier over GF(2163) and used the
irreducible polynomial P (x) = x163+x7+x6+x3+1.2 We
used the NIST test battery composed of 15 statistical tests.
As an input to the NIST test, we took the most significant
bitstream of a size 10 Mb. The results are shown in Table II.
For a comparison purpose, we have examined a randomness
of a 163-bit LFSR with the same primitive polynomial and
compared it to our proposed TPG. The global parameters
are set such that if the result of the test is greater than 0.01
a bit sequence is considered as random.
Table II
NIST RANDOMNESS RESULTS OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT BITSTREAM.
Test TPG LFSR
Frequency 0.534146 0.779188
BlockFrequency 0.739918 0.494392
CumlativeSums 0.911413 0.595549
Runs 0.350485 0.145326
LongestRun 0.911413 0.616305
Rank 0.739918 0.534140
FFT 0.350480 0.037560
NonOverlappingTemplate 0.911413 0.883171
OverlappingTemplate 0.350485 0.304126
Universal 0.213309 0.262240
ApproximateEntropy 0.350485 0.816537
RandomExcursions 0.819544 0.816537
RandomExcursionsVariant 0.788728 0.995711
Serial 0.534146 0.574903
Linear 0.000000 0.000000
Table II indicates the good randomness properties of the
sequence for all the tests except the LinearComplexity
test. In this test the input bitstream is split into N blocks
of length M bits (e.g. 500 ≤ M ≤ 5000). Now, by using
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [9] the test tries to find the
shortest LFSR which can generate all the bits in the block
i (i = 1, . . . , N ). An LFSR that is too short implies non-
randomness. Since our TPG is a pseudorandom number
generator, it is likely that there exist short LFSRs which can
generate the M -bit blocks. This is generally true for most
of the pseudorandom number generators. Furthermore, the
same result is obtained in case of testing a 163-bit LFSR.
2This polynomial is standardized by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) and is especially suitable for the efficient imple-
mentation of ECC over GF(2163) [1].
We conclude that the randomness properties of the bit
stream produced by the multiplier in the TPG mode are at
least as good as the LFSR bit stream that is very often used
as a TPG in the BIST environments. Hence, the multiplier
in the TPG mode can be used to produce the good pseudo-
random test patterns. For more information about the NIST
random tests we refer the reader to [1].
C. Multiplier as a Signature Analyzer
A signature analyzer is used to compress a sequence of
the test responses into a single word and thus make the final
comparison much more efficient. A good measure of the
signature analyzer’s quality is the probability of aliasing.
It is a probability that the final signature corresponds to
the expected one while some erroneous responses of a
CUT have been masked and compacted into the signature
analyzer [4].
By applying only a minor change, our proposed multi-
plier can be represented as an internal Multiple Input Shift
Register (MISR) which is widely used as an SA in the BIST
schemes. A transformation is performed by setting CTRL0
to logic 0 and CTRL1 to logic 1, and the multiplier acting as
an SA is shown in Fig. 5. Again, the irreducible polynomial
P (x) is chosen as explained in the previous section and
determines the X2 array. A response of the CUT is taken
from the input C. If the bit errors of the input patterns are
equally probable, the aliasing probability of such an SA
tends towards 1
2r
, where r is the length of the register [5].
In our case, the aliasing probability is equal to 1
2m
.
When used in the SA mode, the multiplier is in the same
state during the Setup Phase and the Configuration Phase.
By setting the CTRL0 signal low, we ignore the influence
of the XOR gate X1 at the LSB of A. In order to prevent
masking of the erroneous responses we make the A1 array
transparent to the CUT response C by setting the CTRL1
signal high (see Fig. 2b).
A0
>
. . .
C0 C1 Cm-1
A1 A2
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Am-1
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X2 X1 X1
C2
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Figure 5. Digit-serial multiplier in the SA mode.
D. Self-Test
This section examines the use of the multiplier for its
own testing (ST mode). The key idea is to configure the
multiplier such that it concurrently acts as both a TPG and
an SA. In the ST mode the outputs are fed back to the inputs
providing the test patterns. Concurrently working as the SA,
the multiplier compacts its outputs to the final signature.
In order to estimate the number of patterns required to
test the multiplier, the pseudorandom testability properties
of the structure from Fig. 3 are examined. Assuming that
the primary inputs are chosen uniformly at random, which
is justified in Section III-B, we can set the controllability
of B, C, A and Q to 1
2
. This enables calculation of the fault
detectability for all nodes in the circuit.
Table III
RANDOM TESTABILITY PROPERTIES OF THE BASIC BUILDING BLOCK.
Node C0 C1 O P0 P1
B 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
4
1
4
C 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
4
1
4
A 1
2
1
2
1 1
2
1
2
Q 1
2
1
2
1 1
2
1
2
X 3
4
1
4
1 1
4
3
4
Y 1
2
1
2
1 1
2
1
2
O 1
2
1
2
1 1
2
1
2
Table III depicts random pattern testability properties of
the circuit from Fig. 3. The critical fault detectability is
p = min{Pi} =
1
4
, which indicates that the circuit is highly
testable with the pseudorandom test vectors. To estimate the
test set length N for a given test quality of q = 99 % and
p = 1
4
we recall Eq. (1) and obtain N = 22. In other words,
in order to detect all possible 14 faults of the circuit from
Fig. 3 with the probability of 99 %, we need to test the
circuit with 22 random test vectors.
Since the multiplier is composed of the basic building
blocks, we can reuse the testability analysis given above to
estimate the number of patterns required to test the whole
multiplier. The critical fault detectability of 1
4
remains the
same, but the number of critical faults increases. Addition-
ally, by observing Fig. 2b we note that the input B of the
basic building block is same for all m blocks. The same
holds for the input Q. Therefore, to estimate the upper
bound of the test length, we assume that the circuit has
at most k = 14m faults. We again set the test quality to
q = 99 % and p = 1
4
. For the case of m = 163, the upper
bound of the test length is estimated to N = 43 random
test vectors.
However, in ST mode the multiplier should operate in
both TPG and SA mode. To ensure the correct response
compaction, the input B should be fixed to logic one (see
Section III-C). An eventual erroneous response will be
masked whenever the Bi bit is low (see Fig. 2b). Assuming
that the value of B is chosen uniformly at random, we
expect approximately the same number of logic 1’s and
0’s, and therefore the number of test patterns needs to be
doubled in order to ensure correct response compaction
with the predicted aliasing probability. In our case, the
number of necessary test vectors increases to 86.
Similar to the TPG mode, the multiplier in ST mode
needs first to be initialized properly by setting both CTRL0
and CTRL1 high (Setup Phase). Later, in the Configuration
Phase, the control signal CTRL0 is set to logic 1 and the
CTRL1 signal is set to logic 0 (see Fig. 2b and Table I).
By setting the CTRL0 signal high, the multiplexer M3
passes Am−1 bit of the register A and ensures testing of the
rightmost XOR gate in the X1 array. Similarly, by setting
the CTRL1 signal low, the multiplexer M2 passes the MSB
of the register B and ensures the proper testing of the A1
array (see Fig. 2b).
To justify the theoretical approach we provide experi-
mental results of the fault simulation and a fault coverage
of the proposed multiplier scheme. A fault simulation is
performed using the Synopsys Tetramax test suite [17].
The first fault simulation of the multiplier is performed by
using an internal TPG provided by the simulation tool. The
analysis in Section III has shown that 43 random input
vectors are enough to fully test the multiplier with the
confidence level of 99 %. We implement the multiplier over
GF(2163) using the UMC 0.13 µm CMOS standard cell
library and apply 43 random test patterns in order to test
it. The simulation is repeated 100,000 times and the fault
coverage of 100 % occurs in 99,759 simulations (99.76 %).
In this case, the fault coverage is defined as the percentage
of detected faults out of all injected faults [17]. Therefore,
the experimental results confirm the previous theoretical
analysis.
The second simulation verifies the Self-Test approach de-
scribed in Section III-D. The test patterns are now generated
by the multiplier itself and fed back to it. Our analysis in
Section III-D points out that in order to test the complete
multiplier with the confidence level of 99 % and to ensure
correct response compaction, we need to generate at most
86 random test vectors. However, the results show that 104
test vectors are necessary for the full fault coverage with
the confidence level of 99 %. The explanation of this result
lays in the fact that 86 random test patterns is a too short
sequence for our TPG in order to meet the requirements in
terms of randomness. On the other hand, the results prove
that the multiplier is a complete self-testable design.
E. Hardware Overhead
This section presents the hardware overhead of the
proposed test scheme. We have synthesized two digit-
serial multipliers over GF(2163) as proposed in Fig. 2a and
Fig. 2b. The UMC 0.13 µm CMOS standard cell library and
the Synposys Design Vision tool version Y-2006.06 were
used for the synthesis. The results are given in Table IV
and show that by introducing an overhead of only 0.33 %
(three dark multiplexers in Fig. 2b and some control logic)
we can boost the functionality of the multiplier and have
a TPG and an SA in the same circuit. Additionally, the
multiplier becomes a self-testable design.
Table IV
HARDWARE OVERHEAD OF THE PROPOSED TEST SCHEME.
Design Area (GE) Overhead
Original Multiplier 4473 -
Proposed Multiplier 4488 0.33 %
Note that the hardware overhead represents only the
additional hardware attached to the multiplier. Depending
on the concrete application and the use of the multiplier,
some more control logic to support the testing mode is
also needed. Additionally, a comparator for comparing the
signature obtained by the multiplier and the precalculated
value is a necessary component. Since this heavily depends
on the application we do not include it in our estimations.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed the low cost BIST based
on digit serial multiplier over GF (2m). The multiplier is
configured such that it acts as a Test Pattern Generator
and a Signature Analyzer providing the BIST infrastructure
for the surrounding components. Furthermore, it is shown
that the multiplier is a self-testable design meaning that
the errors in its own structure can be detected (ST mode).
The introduced hardware overhead of only 0.33 % makes
it highly suitable for low-end devices. The proposed TPG
behaves very similar to an LFSR which is typically used
for generating random patterns in the BIST environments.
An ability to transform the multiplier into an MISR results
in a very low aliasing probability and makes the multiplier
a perfect choice for the SA.
The proposed scheme can be widely exploited in testing
cryptographic applications, especially public-key crypto cir-
cuits. Those circuits process and store the sensitive data and
hence, BIST is a highly suitable solution for fault detection.
As the modular multiplication is a basic operation for most
of the public-key algorithms, the modular multiplier is an
integral part of these cryptographic cores, and therefore is
a good choice for the BIST circuitry.
Having a multiplier over binary fields, limits the pro-
posed approach to a certain number of public-key cryp-
tosystems. Our future research will deal with the modular
multipliers over integers and eventually will broaden the
application to more of the existing cryptosystems.
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